Preliminary results in routing games

This problem is formulated as a zero-sum game between the designer of the routing algorithm and an adversary that attempts to intersect packets. We show that for some versions of the game, the optimal routing policies also maximize the bandwidth between the source to the destination node.

In this paper we also list problems in this area that remain open. However, there has been little work on secure routing where packets are under threat of being corrupted or ltered by an attacker. Documents: Advanced Search Include Citations. Authors: Advanced Search Include Citations. We show that for some versions of the game, the optimal routing policies also maximize the throughput between the source to the destination node.

In this paper we also list problems in this area that remain open. However, there has been little work on secure routing where packets are under threat of being corrupted or filtered by an attacker.

In this paper we are interested in determining routing policies for the network that are robust with respect to attempts of packet interception by an adversary. To this effect, we will formalize routing design as a game between two players: the designer of the routing algorithm and an adversary that attempts to intersect packets.

This game is investigated under different rules and information structures. In some cases, the game reduces to the well known max flow problem for which there exists computationally efficient algorithms.